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Changesin real stock-market prices have a lot of explanatory value of
the growth rate of U.S. aggregate business investment, especially for long
samples that begin in 1891 or 1921. Moreover, for the period since 1921
where data on a q-type variable are available, the stock market dramatically
outperforms q.The change in real stock prices also retains its predictive
value in the presence of a cash-flow variable, such as after-tax corporate
profits. Basically similar results apply to Canadian investment, except that
the U.S. stock market turns out to have move preditive power than the
Canadian market.I discuss some possible explanations for this puzzling





Cambridge, MA 02138A literature initiated by Tobin (1969) relates investment to q, which is
the ratio of the market's valuation of capital to the long-run cost of
acquiring new capital. An increase in the prospective return on capital or a
decrease in the market's discount rate raises q and thereby increases
investment. With a simple form of adjustment cost for changing the capital
stock, the optimal amount of current investment depends only on the current
value of q. But more generally—for example, with a time-to-build technology
for the capital stock—current investment depends on current and lagged
values of q (see Hayashi, 1982, and Abel and lilanchard, 1986).
The growth rate of investment relates to current and lagged values of
proportionate changes in q. An important source of variation in the
numerator of q—the market value of capital—is the change in stock-market
prices. Therefore, q theory can rationalize a positive relation between
investment and current and lagged changes in stock-market prices, as
estimated by Fama (1981) and Darro (1989), among others.
As is well known (see, for example, llayashi, 1982), the distinction
between average and marginal q can cause difficulty in empirical
implementations of the theory. For example, changes in relative prices—such
as those for energy relative to other goods—may move the stock market in one
direction and the incentive to invest in the other direction. That is,
marginal q (associated with investment in the new capital, which is suited to
the current configuration of relative prices) may rise (or fall), while
average q (associated with the existing capital) may fall (or rise). Tax
changes, especially when they treat old and new capital differently, can have
similar effects. If the data refer to average q, as is typically the case,
the theory will perform well only if the dominant disturbances relate to2
changes in the prospective returns on all forms of capital or toshifts in
market discount rates.
The established empirical view (derived from results of von Furstenberg,
1977; Clark, 1979; and Summers, 1981, among others) is that measures ofthe
market value of capital (q-type variables) have only limited explanatory
power for investment. Furthermore, when measuresof corporate profits or
production or similar variables are considered, the statistical significance
of the market-valuation variables tends to disappear. Of course, corporate
profits and production are simultaneously determined with investment, and
this simultaneity can account for the "explanatory value" of these variables.
But the view in the enpirical literature is that even predetermined values of
variables like profits or production leave market-valuation measures with
little predictive power for investment. I found this conclusion difficult to
reconcile with the strong relations between investment (and other
macroeconomic variables, such as GNP) aiid stock-market returns, as reported
in Fama (1981) and Barro (1989). The explanation, discussed below, is that
the stock market does much better than the measures of q that have been used
in previous empirical studies of investment.
Results fj U.S. Investment aii4
Table I shows regressions with annual U.S. data for DIE, the growth rate
of real, non-residential, fixed, private, domestic investment. I do not
consider broader definitions of investment--which would include expenditures
on residential housing and other consumer durables, and perhaps outlays on
human capital--since these flows do not relate directly to stock-market
prices or other variables that measure the market value of business capital.3
(Results for the corporate component of investment—which relates naturally
to the stock market and to corporate profits—are basically similar to those
for my broader concept of business investment.)
The investment variable consists of expenditures on capital goods, and is
therefore gross of depreciation. In some models (where adjustment costs
pertain to gross expenditures, rather than to net investment), it is gross
investment that relates naturally to q- type variables. ilowever, in other
settings (where replacement expenditures do not entail any adjustment cost),
it is net investment that would be associated with q.In any event, since
available measures of depreciation are largely arbitrary, the choice of gross
investment tends to be dictated on grounds of data availability.
The sample periods considered in Table 1, which exclude dates around
World Wars I and II, are 1891-1914, 1921-40, 1948-87; 1921-40, 1948-87; and
1948-87. The variables considered are:
DIE: Growth rate of investment (year I relative to year i-I).
STOCK1: Growth rate for year I of the real stock-market price.
For 1926-85 I used the value-weighted return on stocks
(exclusive of dividends!) from the Center for Research in
Securities Prices (CRSP) of the University of Chicago. For
1986-87 I used the returns based on the New York Stock Exchange
'From the standpoint of q theory, the change in investment depends on the
change in the market value of capital. Therefore, it is appropriate to
measure stock returns exclusive of dividends. Conceptually, it would also be
desirable to adjust for retained earnins. However, the measurement of
retained earnings is problematic since it requires an estimate of
"depreciation."4
index, as reported by DRI. For 1871- 1925 I used the returns
based on the Cowles Commission (1939) index for the value of
all stocks. The inflation rate for the GNP deflator (year
relative to year 1-1) was subtracted from the change in nominal
stock prices to compute real changes. (Although the timing of
inflation and stock returns is off slightly, I found that the
adjustment of the nominal returns for inflation has, in any
event, only a minor effect on the results.)
DI'RCF: The first difference of the ratio of after-tax corporate
profits to CM)' (the value for year t less that for year i-i).
For 1929-87, corporate profits are the standard national
accounts' numbers, which adjust for capital consumption and
inventory revaluation. Numbers for 1919-28 (provided by
Changyong Rhee) are after-tax corporate profits as reported in
issues of Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income.
Dq1: Growth rate of q (year I relative to year I-I), where
refers to the end of year I.(Thus, Dq1 lines up with STOCK1.)
The measure of q, constructed by Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers
(1988) and provided by Changyong Rhee, is an estimate of the
ratio of total market value of corporations (equity plus debt)
to corporate capital stock at reproduction cost. The measures
of capital stock include standard estimates of depreciation.
The variable used makes no separate adjustment for taxes.
Growth rate of real CM)' (year I relative to year 1-1).5
Regressions 1 and 2 of Table 1 apply to the 1891- 1914, 1921-40, 1948-87
sample, for which I lacked data on corporate profits and q. Regression 1
showsthe substantial explanatory power of the one-year- lagged real
stock-price change, STUCK1J,forthe growth rate of investment, D11.The
estimated coefficient on STOCKJis.57, s.e. =.05(t-value =12.5).With
thelagged dependent variable,D111, alsoincluded as a regressor, the It2 is
.67. (Even without D11_1,theIt2 is .53.) The contemporaneousvariable,
STCCKg, is insignificant in regression 2. Thus, the results suggest that
some disturbance—such as a shift in the prospective real return on
capital—shows up as a shift in stock-market valuation and, with about a
one-year lag, as an increase in investment expenditures. (Lags of STOCK
beyond the first are insignificant if added to regression 1.)
The use of nominal stock-price changes, rather than real changes, makes
only a minor difference. For example, if the one-year lag of the nominal
price change is substituted for the real change in regression 1, the
estimated coefficient changes little and the &2 falls from .67 to .65. The
effect is minor because the nominal capital gain on stocks is so much more
volatile than inflation. Over the period, 1891- 1914, 1921-40, 1948-87, the
standard deviation of the nominal capital gain is .19, while that for
inflation is .04; hence, the correlation between the nominal and real capital
gains on stocks turns out to be .975. Despite this high correlation, the
results for investment indicate a clear preference for the real capital gain
as an explanatory variable. If nominal and real gains are included
simultaneously, the estimated coefficient of the lagged nominal gain is .01,
s.e. =.23,while that on the lagged real gain is .56, s.e. =.23.Thus, as6
theory predicts, the data indicate that investment relates to the change in
real market value, rather than nominal market value.
Regressions 3-9 of Table 1 deal with the period, 1921-40, 1948-87.
Regression 3, which includes the one-year lag of the real stock-price change,
is similar to regression 1. Regression 4 shows that—with the stock-market
variable omitted—the variable Dq11 has some explanatory value for DIE,
although the is only .31. This finding is consistent with those reported
in the empirical literature. Regression 5 shows that the stock-price change
dominates the q variable—the estimated coefficient of Dq1, -.03,s.e. =
.08,is essentially zero, while that on STOCK1J is about the same as that
shownin regression 3.
Theseresults are surprising in that q takes account of stock-market
valuation, and also considers changes in the market value of corporate debt.
In addition, the q variable allows in the denominator for changes in the
stock of capital at reproduction cost. Thus, q measures total market value
per unit of physical capital. (In contrast, even without changes in the
market value of debt, stock-price indices err in not adjusting for retained
earnings.)
Theoretically, the features that Dq adds to the change in real stock
prices ought to matter for the relation between market valuation and
investment. On the other hand, in terms of measurement, stock prices are
much more accurate than the estimated changes in the market value of
corporatedebt or the computed changes in the quantity of corporate capital
at reproduction cost (which involve rough estimates of depreciation).
Moreover,despite the high variability of stock prices, it is not true that
these changes dominate the sample variations in Dq. The results in Table 17
indicate that the differences between STOCK and Dq are important, and that
the data clearly prefer STUCK to Dq.
It may be that Dq is the change in real stock prices plus a variable that
is dominated by noise. In this case it would not be surprising that the
stock-price change would perform much better than Dq in a relation for
investment. It is also possible that the results mean that components of Dq
other than the change in real stock prices—such as revaluations of corporate
debt—do not matter for investment in the way that q theory would predict.
This possibility is worth further investigation.
Regression 6 shows that, with the stock-market variable excluded, the
lagged profit variable, DPRUF1J, has significant explanatory power for Di
(coefficient of 5.0, s.e. =1.1),although theft2 is only .34. With STOCKJ
also included in regression 7, D)'JUJFgbecomes less important (coefficient
of 2.1, s.c. =0.8),but is still significantly positive. However, the
lagged stock-price change, STUCK,playsthe main predictive role—the
coefficient here is .48, s.e. =.05.2
Regression 8 adds contemporaneous values of the changes in stock prices
and the profit ratio. The current stock-market variable, STOCK1, is
insignificant, but the current change in the profit ratio, DFROI1, is highly
significant (coefficient of 3.4, s.e. =0.6).Even so, the lagged variables
remain significant—the coefficient of STOCK11 is nov 31, s.e. =.05,while
that on DPROF is 2.1, s.e. =0.6.
2The results for real versus nominal stock-price changes are similar to those
for the longer sample. If the nominal variable is added to regression 3, its
t-value is 0.1, while that on the real variable is 1.9. In regression 7, the
respective t-values are 0.3 and 1.9.8
I would interpret regression 8 by thinking again about an exogenous
disturbance, such as a change in the prospective return on capita1. The
results suggest that this kind of shock has an immediate reflection in
stock-market valuation and some contemporaneous effect on the ratio of
corporate profits to CR!'. The principal effect on investment expenditures
and the larger impact on the profit ratio show up with a one-year lag. As
would be expected, there is no lagged effect on stock prices—that is, the
full adjustment of financial prices is contemporaneous with the disturbance.
Results for the 1948-87 sample (regressions 10-16 in Table 1) are
basically similar to those for the period, 1921-40, 1948-87. One difference
is that the estimated coefficients on the lagged stock-market variable,
STOCKfJ, and the current change in the profit ratio, DIROFt, aresmaller
than before.4
3Again, the data indicate some preference for real stock-price changes over
nominal changes. If the nominal variable is added to regression 10, its
t-value is 0.3 while that for the real variable is 1.4. In regression 14 the
respective t- values are 0.7 and 1.6.
4Changes in nominal interest rates—such as the commercial paper rate—are
significant for DI over the 1948-87 period, but not for the longer samples.
In the post-World War II period, the estimated coefficient of DR1 (where DR
is the change in the nominal interest rate) is negative, while that of DR is
positive. The lagged change in real stock prices, STOCKisstill
significantly positive here. However, for a more recent sample—such as
1960-87—the inclusion of the interest-rate terms eliminates the statistical
significance of STCCKJ. In contrast, for the longer samples (those
starting in 1891 or 1921), the interest- rate variables are insignificant and
have a negligible effect on the estimated coefficient and standard error for
STOCK_JI an unsure what effects are picked up in the recent period by the
changes in nominal interest rates. However, the shifting role over time
likely reflects the changing behavior of inflation. Notably, changes in
nominal interest rates probably proxy mainly for shifts in expected inflation
in the recent period, but mainly for variations in expected real interest
rates in earlier periods.9
Table 2 shows regressions with the dependent variable changed to the
growth rate of real 6W?. The results are basically similar to those shown in
Table 1, although the estimated coefficients on STOCK azid OPEC! tend to be
smaller in Table 2. These results accord with the much greater volatility
of investment than of CX?.
Forecasts Associated tJi Stock-Market Crashes f12E and 19Z2
Correspondingto the stock-market crash of October 1987, the rate of
change of nominal stock prices for that month was -.247(per month). For
1987 overall, the annual rate of change of real stock prices was -.032.
Thus, if the October 1987 rate of change in stock prices had equaled the
sample mean over 1948-87 of .0065 per month (and if inflation and the other
changes in real stock prices remained as they were), the rate of change of
real stock prices for 1987 would have been .222. In other words, the
stock-market crash lowered the annual rate of change of real stock prices for
1987 by .254.
The decrease in real stock prices in 1987 corresponds to a reduced
forecast of growth in investment and CX? for 1988. For example, using the
Unlike for investment, the preference between real and nominal gains on
stocks is less clear for CIV?.Ifthe nominal stock-price change is added to
regression 1 (for the 1891-1914, 1921-40, 1948-87 sample), the t-value is
1.6, while that for the real change is 0.5. The results are similar for
regression 3 (for the 1921-40, 1948-87 sample), where the respective t-values
are 1.7 and 0.2. Uowever, in regression 5, the t-values are each 0.9. For
resression 7 (1948-87 sample), the t-value for the nominal variable is 1.0,
while that for the real variable is 1.8. Similarly, in regression 9, the
respective t-values are 1.1 and 1.9.10
regressions for the 1891-1914, 1921-40, 1948-87 sample (Table 1, regression
1, and Table 2, regression 1), the stock-market crash implied thatthe
forecasted annual growth rates for 1988 over 1987 fell from .123 to .021 for
investment, and from .059 to .021 for GYP. The sensitivity of these growth
forecasts to the stock market is reduced if one uses estimates based on the
1948-87 sample. Using the regressions for this sample (Table 1, regression
14, and Table 2, regression 9), the projected growth rates for 1988 over 1987
fell from .066 to -.004for investment, and from .049 to .023 for GYP. (I
assumed here that corporate profits for 1987 were not altered along with the
stock-market crash.) In any event, the crash corresponded to a revision from
a forecast of a strong boom for 1988 to a prediction of below-average growth.
The actual economic performance for 1988 turned out to be strong; growth
rates for 1988 over 1987 were .079 for investment and .035 for 6W?. Table 3
compares these outcomes with forecasts based on regressions from the various
samples covered in Tables 1 and 2. Although the actual growth rates exceed
the projected values in each case, the gap is never statistically significant
at the 57. level. Thus, while the stock market did not predict well for 1988,
one cannot conclude with any confidence from this observation that the
economy has shifted to a new regime where the stock market is generally
unreliable. In other words, given the typical margin of error for the
sample, the incorrect forecasts for 1988 are not all that unusual.
The last two cases in Table 3 consider the forecasts for 1930-32 that
would have emerged after the stock-market crash of 1929. In this case,
regressions for the growth of investment and GM? were estimated (based on
lagged growth and the lagged real return on stocks) over the sample,
1891-1914, 1921-29. While the plunge in stock prices accurately predicted a11
decline in economic activity after 1929, the forecasts substantially
understate the extent of the decline in this case.6 For CM? growth, the gap
between forecasted and actual values for 1930-32 is statistically significant
at the 5% level (F0 =9.8),while for investment growth the gap is not
significant (F0 =2.1).
Putting 1987 and 1929 together, there is no indication that stock-market
crashes are systematically ignored in terms of the response of economic
activity. In the recent case, the economy did better than stock-market-based
predictions would have said, while in the earlier case, the reverse applied.
One likely possibility is that stock-market crashes occur at times when
economic conditions are volatile, so that forecast errors are higher than
usual. But, in terms of the forecast mean, there is no reason to think that
economic activity relates differently to stock returns at times of
stock-market crashes than at other times.
Results with Monthly Stock-Price Chanzes
Table 4 shows results for the annual growth of investment andCR?over
the long-term sample (1891-1914, 1921-40, 1948-87), using monthly changes in
real stock prices as regressors. Each monthly term is the logarithm of stock
prices at the end of the month less the logarithm of stock prices at the end
of the previous month. To get a rough estimate of the change in real stock
prices, I subtracted the inflation rate for the year (expressed on a monthly
6.The "forecasts" for 1931 and 1932 were based on the actual values of lagged
growth and lagged stock returns for 1930 and 1931. Thus, the calculated
values are not true forecasts. However, the computations are appropriate for
seeing whether the data for 1930-32 satisfy the same relationship as those
for the prior years.12
basis), calculated from the annual CX? deflator. In other words, the
inflation rate used is the same for all 12 months within a given year.7
The regression for investment shows that this year's growth rate (annual
average of investment f or year I relative tothat for year t-1) relates
especially to real stock-price changes between May and December of the
previous year.8 Estimated coefficients for monthly stock-price changesin
the current year turn out to be insignificant, as do those for changes prior
to December of two years' previous. The standard error of each coefficient
on monthly stock-price movements is fairly high (about 0.2), whichallows for
a good deal of random variation in point estimates from month tomonth.
Nevertheless, there is some indication of a distributed lag pattern for the
coefficients that rises between December and September of the previous year
The results are similar if changes in nominal stock prices are used instead
of changes in real stock prices, although the fit for investment is somewhat
better with the real prices. (The fit for CMI' is virtually identical with
real or nominal prices.) It would be possible to use monthly inflation rates
for the CPI back to 1913 or for wholesale prices for the entire sample,
although the accuracy of the earlier data are unclear. (Even at recent times
the "monthly" figures do not always refer to prices sampled within the
indicated month.) I think that the results would not chane much with a
shift to monthly inflation numbers, because the main function of the
adjustment for inflation is to capture the secular changes in the inflation
rate. The inflation rates calculated from the annual 6W? deflator are
satisfactory in this respect.
8For samples prior to World War II, the data on investment and GM? are
available only on an annual basis. Therefore, I related annual growth rates
of investment and 6W? to a distributed lag of monthly stock returns. Even
for the post-World War II period, my experience is that little additional
information obtains by using quarterly, rather than annual, values of the
national accounts' variables. Much of the true underlying information comes
from annual data and the quarterly observations also bring in important
variations due to seasonals.13
and then gradually diminishes to reach close to zero within about 15 months.
The results for CM?, also shown in Table 4, reveal a similar pattern.
AComparisonQj Results jçj Canada a&ilth UnitedStates
Table 5 shows regression results for the growth rate of investment (real,
non-residential, fixed, private, domestic) in Canada for the period, 1928-40,
1948-87. (The main national accounts' data for Canada begin in 1926,
although some data are available earlier.) The growth rate of real stock
prices for Canada is based on the Toronto 300 composite index.
Regressions 1-4—which use data on investment, real stock prices, and
after-tax corporate profits as a ratio to CMF—are comparable to results
reported before for the United States. Regression 1 shows the explanatory
power of lagged changes in real stock prices for the growth of investment.
The main difference from the U.S. case is that the It2 of .61 is somewhat
lower. (Over the period 1928-40, 1948-87, the It2 for a parallel U.S.
regression is .72.) Regression 3 shows that, as with the United States, the
lagged change in the corporate profit ratio has some additional explanatory
power for the growth of investment. In Regression 4, the contemporaneous
stock return is again insignificant for the growth of investment. The
current change in the corporate profits ratio is significant, but—unlike for
the United States—the lagged value has a larger coefficient (and greater
t-value) than the contemporaneous value.
It is often argued that the U.S. economy has a large, perhaps dominant,
influence on the Canadian economy. Therefore, it is natural to consider U.S.
variables as regressors for Canadian investment growth. Regression 5 adds
the U.S. lagged variables that I used before to explain U.S. investment14
growth—D11_,STUCK , andDI'R0111—toan equation for Canadianinvestment
growth. This equation also includes the Canaxlianlaggedvariables as
regressors—thatis, the same set of variables included in regression 3 of
table 5. The striking result in regression 5 is that the lagged change in
U.S. stock prices is significant (.43, s.e. =.14),while the lagged change
in Canadian stock prices is insignificant (-.13,s.e. =.16).9That is,
changes in U.S. stock prices predict growth in Canadian investment,
but—holding fixed the behavior of the U.S. stock market—the change in
Canadian stock prices has no predictive value for growth in Canadian
investment. The apparent predictive role for the Canadian stock market in
regressions 1, 3, and 4 of Table 5 can be attributed to the strong positive
correlation (.87) between the changes in Canadian and U.S. real stock prices
over the sample period.
Instead of entering the three lagged U.S. variables separately, one can
combine them into the implied forecast for U.S. investment growth. The
variable Dit in regression 6 of Table 5 is the fitted value from a regression
(over the sample 1928-40, 1948-87) of U.S. investment growth on a constant
and the U.S. values of DIti, STOCK
i_I,
and DPROF1_J. Note that the fit of
regression 6 is virtually the same as that in regression 5. Therefore, the
usual likelihood-ratio test accepts the hypothesis that the U.S. variables
matter for Canadian investment growth only to the extent that these variables
predict U.S. investment growth.
The Canadian variables turn out to have little influence on the growth of
U.S. investment. In particular, the types of results reported for the United
States in Table tare not substantially affected if Canadian variables are
entered as additional regressors.15
Regression 7 in Table 5 shows that the conclusion about the
insignificance of Canadian stock-price changes for Canadian investment growth
still holds if one includes the contemporaneous values, STOCK1 or Di'1W11, for
Canada. Regressions 8 and 9 shows that the same conclusion also applies if
one replaces the forecasted value of U.S. investment growth, DIE, with the
actual value, D11.
The results about the connection between Canadian investment andthe
Canadian and U.S. stock markets are less clear if one limits attention to the
post-World War II period. With only the lagged Canadian variables included,
the coefficient of STUCK1J for the 1948-87 sample is .14, s.e. =.07,which
is much smaller than the value (.33, s.e. =.08)shown in regression 3 of
Table 5. With the lagged U.S. values also entered, the coefficient of
511/Cl11 for Canada again becomes insignificant—the estimate is -.05,s.e.
.15, which is similar to the value (-.13,s.e. =.16)shown in regression 5.
However, while the coefficient of STOCK for the United States is positive,
it is. now statistically insignificant—the estimated value is .23, s.e. =
.16.Thus, the results for the 1948-87 period are consistent with the idea
that Canadian investment relates more to the U.S. stock market than to the
Canadian market. But the results also indicate that Canadian investment is
only weakly related to developments on either stock market over this period.
The main evidence for a link between the U.S. stock market and Canadian
investment comes when the data from 1928- 40 are added to the sample (as in
Table 5). Thus, the behavior during the depressed 1930s is playing a major
role in the findings.
It is not surprising that the U.S. economy would have a significant
influence on Canadian investment. For example, a boom in the United States16
could raise the return on Canadiancapitalandtherebystimulate Canadian
investment.But, in this story, the U.S. boom would also raise the market
valueof Canadian capital—that is, Canadian stock prices and q would rise.
Ifthese market values were held fixed, itis unclear why U.S. events would
influenceCanadian investment. Therefore, assuming that the Canadianstock
market is a good measure of the market value of capital in Canada, the
results shown in Table 5 (regressions 5-9) are puzzling.
One possibility is that the stock-price index that I used—the Toronto
300 composite—is not a very good measure of the market value of capital
located in Canada. I have, however, been assured by some Canadian
researchers that this measure is the best available broad index of Canadian
stock- market prices.
Another consideration is that much of Canadian domestic investment is
carried out by U.S. firms. The shares in these firms are typically traded on
the U.S. stock market, rather than the Canadian market. Thus, to the extent
that Canadian investment is carried out by foreigners (specifically,
Americans), there is a good reason that Canadian investment would not relate
to the Canadian stock market. But, it must be the case overall that the
Canadian stock market is more accurate than the U.S. market as an indicator
of the value of capital in place in Canada. Thus, I am skeptical that this
element accounts for the results in Table 5.
A familiar problem with the empirical implementation of q theory is the
distinction between marginal and average q, with the theory relating more to
the former and the data to the latter. This distinction would be
particularly helpful if I were trying to explain why neither Canadian nor
U.S. stock prices did very well in predicting Canadianinvestment.However,17
the main puzzle is why the U.S. stock market does as well as it does in
predicting Canadian investment, especially over the sample, 1928-40, 1948-87.
The general problems with using average q to proxy for marginal q would
apply to both the U.S. andCanadianstock markets. But one reason why this
elementmight matter more for Canada is that Canadian production and
investment are more related to natural resources, specifically to energy,
thanare U.S. production andinvestment.Since the distinction between
marginal and average q is particularly important when there are variations in
the relative price of energy, it is conceivable that the U.S. stock market is
better than the Canadian stock market as a proxy for marginal q (averaged
over industries) in Canada. Therefore, an argument along these lines might
explain why Canadian investment relates more to the U.S. stock market than to
the Canadian market. One reason for skepticism, however, is that the
strongest role for the U.S. stock market in the Canadian investment equation
emerges when the period 1928-40 is also included. This period, which
substantially predates the times of oil shocks, is not one where the natural
resource story is likely to be compelling.
Summary j Major Findiiws
Many empirical studies have related business investment to q, which is
the ratio of the market's evaluation of capital to the long-run cost of
acquiring new capital. A typical finding in this literature is that
q- measures have only limited predictive value for investment. In contrast, I
find for the United States—especially for long samples that begin in 189! or
1921-- that lagged changes in real stock-market prices have a lot of
explanatory value for the growth rate of investment. Moreover, for the18
period since 1921 where data on a q- typevariable are also available, the
stock-market variable dramatically outperforms q. This result arises even
though the change in the q measure approximates the changein real stock
prices plus other variables that ought to matterfor investment. One
plausible interpretation of these results is that the other componentsof q
are measured inaccurately, relative to stock-market prices.
Even in the presence of cash-flow variables, such as contemporaneousand
lagged values of after-tax corporate profits, thestock-market variable (but
not q) retains significant predictive power for investment. Anoverall
interpretation of these results is that an exogenous disturbance (such as an
increase in the prospective rate of return on capital) shows up
contemporaneously as an increase in stock prices and corporate profits,and
with a lag of a year or more as an expansion of investment expenditures and a
further increase in profits.
I examined the stock-market crashes of 1929 and 1987. In the former
case, subsequent investment spending (for 1930-32) performed worsethan the
stock market would have predicted, while in the latter case, the subsequent
spending (for 1988) was surprisingly strong. Nevertheless, one cannot
conclude with any confidence that the relation between stock prices and
investment (or 6W?) is systematically different in the context of
stock-market crashes than at other times.
For Canada since 1928, a simple relation between investment and
stock-price changes (and corporate profits) looks similar to that forthe
United States. However, when the interaction between the two countries is
considered, it turns out that the U.S. stock market has more predictive power
than the Canadian market for Canadian investment. I discuss some possible19

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Forecasts Associated jj.jjJStock-MarketCrashes 2119I 1922
No. Dep. Var.Regression, ForecastForecastActual t or F
Sample Year [57. value]
(1) DI Table1 (1) 1988 -.021 .079t81 =1.24
1891- 1914, 1921-40, [1.99]
1948-87
(2) DI Table2 (1) 1988 .021 .035t81 =0.49
1891-1914,1921-40, [1.99]
1948-87
(3) DI Table1 (7) 1988 -.028 .079t56 =1.35
1921-40, 1948-87 [2.00]
(4) DI Table2 (5) 1988 .015 .035t56 =0.72
1921-40, 1948-87 [2.00]
(5) DI Table1 (14) 1988 -.004 .079t35 =1.59
1948-87 [2.03]
(6) Di' Table2 (9) 1988 .023 .035 t36 =0.59
1948- 87 [2.03]
(7) DI D11 -.D111,STOCI1 1930
-.07 -.19 Fg0 =2.08
1891-1914,1921-29 1931 -.23 -.44 [2.92]
1932 -.36 -.51
(8) DY DY -.DY11,STOCK11
1930 .012 -.099 Fg0 =9.82
1891-1914, 1921-29 1931 -.011-.089 [2.92]
1932 -.028-.144
Noie3: DI isthegrowth rate of investment andDYis the growth rate of CMI'.
Theresults for (1)-(6) refer to the indicated regressions from Tables 1 and
2. Results for (7) and (8) come from regressions over the period 1891- 1914,
1921-29 for investment growth and GNP growth, respectively, with the lagged
dependent variable and the lag of the growth in real stock prices as
regressors. See Tables 1 and 2 for definitions of variables.Table 4
ResultsiJ&Ji Monthly Stock-Price Changes
Dependent Variable DI DY
Constant .006 (.012) .0234 (.0048)
Lagged Dep. Var. .228 (.099) .167 (.103)
Real Stock-Price Changes:
December (-1) .60 .28 .268 .094
November (-1) .54 .21 .144 .070
October (-1) .67 .20 .265 .065
September (-1) .89 .21 .290 .068
August (-1) .51 .19 .094 .060
July (-1) .19 .22 .055 .073
June (-1) .68 .22 .040 .073
May (-1) .45 .23 .047 .077
April (-1) .43 .23 .213 .073
March (-1) .26 .24 .104 .078
February (-1) .49 .31 .137 .098
January (-1) .11.23 .033 .076
December (-2) .46 .29 .057 .098
November (-2) .19 .22 -.062.074




Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variables are DI,
the growth of investment, and DY, the growth of Ct/F. The sample periods are
1891- 1914, 1921-40, 1948-87. Each regression includes a constant, the lagged
dependent variable, and 15 monthly lagged values of changes in real stock
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